The European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) has warned that ESMA’s proposed regulatory technical standards (RTS) on CCP admission criteria under EMIR 3 could impose unnecessary and disproportionate burdens on central counterparties and their clearing members.

In its consultation response, the industry body urges the regulator to first calibrate the specific issues the RTS is intended to address before introducing requirements that may add cost without improving risk management.

EACH argues that the draft RTS risks drifting into areas already covered by prudential supervisors and CCPs’ own risk frameworks. It cautions that overly extensive or unrealistic criteria could force CCPs into a quasi‑regulatory role, duplicating oversight already performed by banking and market regulators.

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The association highlights three overarching concerns:

  • Flexibility must be explicit: CCPs should be able to exclude RTS criteria that are irrelevant for specific membership types, particularly where the CCP has designed models that eliminate certain risks.
  • Avoidance of excessive or unverifiable requirements: Some proposed checks would require intrusive audits or continuous verification that CCPs cannot realistically perform.
  • Complement, don’t duplicate, CCP risk management: Several elements relate to ongoing risk monitoring rather than admission criteria and should not be embedded in onboarding rules.

EACH’s detailed feedback on ESMA’s themes

Transparent, fair and open access

EACH supports ESMA’s proportionality aims but says the RTS does not make this flexibility sufficiently explicit. It wants CCPs to be clearly permitted to exclude irrelevant criteria for membership types that eliminate certain risks. It also notes that EU competitiveness should be considered when defining participation requirements.

Sufficient financial resources

EACH argues the draft RTS conflates admission checks with ongoing risk management. It calls for:

  • Removing scenario‑based tests from paragraph 1, which belong in ongoing risk monitoring.
  • Deleting “where necessary” so CCPs can rely on publicly available financial information rather than requesting documents directly.
  • Amending the restriction on external credit ratings; for low‑risk models such as European Commodity Clearing’s Direct Clearing Participant (DCP), external ratings may be entirely appropriate.
  • Clarifying that CCPs are not expected to verify ongoing access to credit lines, liquidity or FX facilities, as they cannot monitor whether these remain available.
  • Confirming that CCPs do not need to review internal group outsourcing arrangements, only ensure members have adequate risk‑management processes.

Operational capacity

EACH agrees operational resilience is essential but warns that the draft RTS would impose intrusive and duplicative requirements, especially for firms already subject to the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). It recommends:

  • Removing Articles 3(2)–3(4), which would draw CCPs into members’ IT change processes, backup system testing and staff training reviews.
  • Clarifying in Article 3(5) that CCPs may rely on member attestations rather than reviewing internal policies or procedures.

Avoiding duplication

EACH supports licensing checks but strongly opposes requiring CCPs to assess clearing members’ internal risk‑control systems, arguing this duplicates prudential supervision and risks turning CCPs into quasi‑regulators. It also calls for narrowing the vague requirement to assess “legal capacity and ability,” suggesting CCPs should instead focus on the enforceability of key rulebook provisions in the member’s jurisdiction.

Clearing members offering client clearing

EACH sees no need for a separate article. It argues that most criteria already apply to client‑clearing members; CCPs cannot assess future proportions of client vs proprietary activity; and portability requirements for omnibus accounts add little value. It therefore recommends removing the entire article.

Sponsored models

EACH supports strong governance but warns the RTS must not imply mandatory backup sponsorship. Sponsored members should retain the option to liquidate positions if their sponsor defaults.

Non‑financial counterparties

EACH welcomes the flexibility ESMA proposes but asks for clarity that Article 7(a) and 7(b) are alternatives, not additions, to Articles 1–6. It also seeks confirmation that public or commercial bank guarantees permitted under EMIR 3 count as “higher/full collateralisation,” and that the membership ban does not apply to regulated cross‑CCP transactions under the EU Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) Regulationfor the electricity market.